ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

Historical context
In the beginning distribution networks were predominantly unearthed. However, because near 2/3 of phase-toearth faults in utility unearthed networks are arcing and the arc instability frequently escalates overvoltages, leading to new faults in other feeders, neutral earthing policy has evolved in many countries and regions [1, 2] . Two basic trends happened in this historical evolution: the first one led to resonant grounding almost a century ago [3] , and was adopted by most northern and eastern European countries, at least for large networks. The other one was neutral earthing through resistors, dimensioned to guarantee the annulment of neutral voltage before arc restriking, which in turn requires that the neutral current will be larger than the unearthed fault current [1, 3] . A few hundred Amps maximum fault current is a usual specification for resistor neutral earthing. When there is no available neutral point to earth, earthing reactors (also known as artificial neutrals points or ANP) were adopted. Frequently these ANP are three phase oilimmersed zigzag inductances, and this was an earthing solution most applied in many Mediterranean countries. For overhead distribution networks, first applications of ANP were to provide a point where to connect earthing resistors. For underground networks, however, frequently cables isolation requires steady overvoltage limitation (which arises in resistor earthing), which in turn demands lower values for earthing impedance. Because the heat generated in the earthing resistors grows with the reduction of their ohmic value, low impedance reactors are more suitable. In addition, unstable arcing is less common in cables networks. Earthing reactors can be done by dimensioning the leakage reactances of the ANP accordingly. Hence, reactors were adopted for neutral earthing in underground networks in many regions and countries, frequently by ANP leakage design only. A few thousand Amps maximum fault current is a usual specification for those reactors. Half a century ago a standardization process led a prestigious utility to define 300A and 1000A as typical shortcircuit (SC) rated currents for earthing, respectively in overhead and underground networks [4, 5] . It was a time of "public service" paradigm for the utilities, and many more have adopted those standards, saving the corresponding research cost. In time, it was acknowledged that earthing reactors could also be designed to limit fault currents to 300A, and as a consequence they were suggested as the only required means for overhead networks earthing, therefore saving the cost of the resistors. Since then, the operational experience of a number of utilities has shown a larger than expected number of failures in earthing reactors employed in some overhead networks (300A SC rating). Solutions have varied from utility to utility, but a research on the reasons for those failures was not published in international forums so far. The purpose of this paper is to provide a contribution for the understanding of that problem and to propose a new protective solution.
Reactors stresses under feeder short-circuits
Earthing reactors do not have the usual life of a transformer, particularly three phase zigzag inductances. Their usual steady state currents are very often less than 1A, but the current of any single-phase to earth fault in any feeder outgoing from the same MV bus returns from earth through the same shared reactor. Differences between overhead and underground networks are important regarding the ANP job. A cable feeder in a MV network is frequently about half a dozen km long, while average overhead feeders may be some 5 times longer. On the other hand, the number of persistent faults per km is similar for overhead lines and for underground cables, but overhead lines may suffer 5 times more transient faults, which are extinguished through automatic or commanded reclosing. Network extensions vary depending on voltage level and geography, but as a rule MV overhead networks may suffer a number of faults at least 25 times larger than underground networks for the same number of feeders. Most of those faults are single-phase to earth, particularly in overhead lines, therefore earthing reactors are much more stressed in overhead networks. On the other hand, each single fault stresses an earthing reactor both mechanically and thermally. Mechanical stress is particularly demanding when associated to reclosing on fault, because then the probability of fault currents to have a dc component increases. Although sometimes commanded reclosing on fault is applied in cable systems, when sectionalizing plus reclosing and fault sensing are employed for fault location, both automatic and commanded reclosing are much more common in overhead networks. Mechanical stress is usually considered the most demanding for earthing reactors [6] , and standards evolution has underlined mechanical strength requirements [7, 8] . Clamping pressing structures are critical to guarantee the mechanical robustness of the coils carrying short-circuit currents, but mechanical fa-Prague, 8-11 June 2009 Paper 1004 CIRED2009 Session 3
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tigue is cumulative and that has to be accounted for in reactor design. However, a number of reactor failures have been thermal rather than mechanical, frequently preceded by bubble formation and sometimes ending in explosions and fires. Actually, although predominantly reactive, earthing reactors also have some resistance, which usually is around 1/3 to 1/6 of the X value for the rated frequency.
Since standards require the reactors to withstand a full short-circuit current for 10s [7, 8] (5s in old specs [5] ), and considering that most timings of feeder relays do not exceed 1s, it may be thought that Standards provide a comfortable security margin regarding thermal stress. However, it may be not so for overhead networks, as it is shown in what follows.
THERMAL ISSUES
Temperature limits
Earthing reactors employed in MV distribution networks are usually oil-immersed. This means that although the inner cooper in the windings can reach 250ºC under short-circuit without metal inconvenience, as it is precluded by Standards, the truth is that the oil establishes more stringent limits to temperature rising. As a matter of fact, it is well known that the auto-ignition temperature for mineral oil is also around 250ºC, but its flash point, for which bubble formation starts, is 140ºC for typical 2.5% moisture in oil. Increasing the hydrostatic pressure and, moreover, drying the moisture in oil below 0.5%, can increase the flash point to 200ºC or more, but on the other hand a 5% moisture level decrease it to 120ºC [9] . Most MV zigzag reactors do not have paper as winding isolation. Instead, they use cast resin insulation which can usually support 180ºC for a short-time. This is also good from the point of view of moisture, since paper is where most moisture usually accumulates in transformers. Overall, it can be assumed that hermetically sealed, driedout reactors can support winding hot-spot temperatures up to 180ºC under external short-circuits, but bubble production can start below 140ºC in regular oil tanks with conservators, depending on the existing moisture and also on oil ageing.
Thermal model equations
A mathematical model for the thermal dynamics of earthing reactors can be adapted from well established expressions for transformers. From [10] , for example, the next equations for a two-variable lumped model follow:
Where:  w : winding hot-spot temperature;  o : top-oil temperature;  ext : external ambient temperature; R w_o : Nonlinear winding to oil thermal resistance; R o_ext : Nonlinear oil to air thermal resistance; C w : Windings thermal capacitance; C o : Oil (plus tanks and core) thermal capacitance; P cu : Heat power generated in the windings metal (load losses); P fe+ad : Heat power generated in the core (no-load losses).
In these equations, the thermal resistances depend on the temperatures and also strongly on the oil viscosity, which in turn depends also on temperature, leading to a pair of non-linear differential equations. For a ONAN reactor, the dependence of the oil thermal resistances with temperature can be expressed by the expression:
R th (θ ca ) = R th (θ ba )
Where: R th (θ ca ): Thermal resistance for which the pair of temperatures is θ ca =θ c -θ a ; R th (θ ba ): Thermal resistance for which the pair of temperatures is θ ba =θ b -θ a ;
Expressions (2) and (3) mean that if we know the thermal resistances for a pair of temperatures, we will be able to compute them for any other pair. On the other hand, the no-load losses can be taken as constant, but the load losses also depend on temperature, since the resistance of the windings increases with it: 235 ( ) ( ) 235
We can also define the temperature-dependent time constants  w for the winding hot-spot and  o for top-oil:
Since the thermal resistances decrease with the increase in temperatures, so the thermal time constants do. However, they are always much larger than typical electrical time constants, as it will be shown next.
Laboratory data
A 15 kV oil-immersed typical zigzag reactor, 300A SC rated, was analysed in laboratory in order to determine its thermal properties ( fig. 1) . The reactors has X/R =3. 78% of the maximum fault current (this was due to voltage limitations of the fault source) was applied for 9 seconds to the windings, and its resistance was next sampled for half an hour. In addition, the top oil temperature was also sampled for a few hours. The initial temperature was 25ºC for both oil and windings. Figures 2 and 3 show the experimental results. 
Figure 1: the 15 kV zigzag reactor tested in laboratory with straight (non-corrugated) tank walls
FAULT SIMULATION AND THERMAL PER-FORMANCE
Initial conditions to consider for simulation have to account for a summer ambient temperature of  ext =35ºC, and a steady heat production by no-load losses P fe+ad , as well as a steady neutral current of a few Amps resulting from network unbalances and third harmonic currents. No-load losses (about 250 W) increase the top oil temperature in about 12ºC, but the steady load current has a minor effect: no more than 3ºC even with 5A. From these initial conditions, a few simulation runs are illustrated. Fig. 4 shows that actually this reactor follows the old 5 s specification. It also shows that with intervals of 10 minutes, it can withstand three 5 s faults without overcoming a 150ºC limit in the hot spot, but the top-oil temperature keeps climbing even after the last fault. This is a result from the very large time constant of the top-oil temperature, and a consequence is illustrated in Fig. 5 . 
Figure 4: Temperature (ºC) versus time (minutes). In full, windings hot-spot, top-oil in dash.
Red for a 10 s standard fault, black for a 5 s fault. Now a more realistic scenario is modelled. In a substation covering a rural region, under heavy rain and thunderstorms following a summer in which a lot of dust was deposited on line insulators, a large number of faults arose dispersed along the feeders. Automatic reclosing was successful most of the times, but remotely commanded reclosing was also needed to minimize the duration of power interruptions for costumers. Bubble formation and sometimes reactor destruction by fire have happened in such scenarios, not covered by standards but confirmed in laboratory by at least one manufacturer [11] . 
SOLUTIONS
Improved reactor designs
An approach to deal with the inadequacy of former reactor designs to withstand real fault scenarios in overhead networks is to require their capability to withstand 10s short-circuits, as demanded by international Standards. This can be done by a 20% increase in the winding wires diameter, for example, which increases their thermal capacitance and also reduces their electrical resistance and therefore the heat generated under fault. However, it is also essential to increase the cooling of the oil, reducing the oil to air thermal resistance. A 50% reduction for that thermal resistance can be achieved by employing improved heat exchangers, such as radiators or corrugated tanks. If they are hermetically sealed, a further improvement can be reached by drying the oil before, which will increase its flash point. . One way to map the operational requirement that the reactors must withstand repetitive faults for a long time to a standard specification is to add to the required by Standards 10s short-circuit the capability to withstand one such a fault every hour.
Adding a Resistor
Any improved design for the reactors has to increase the windings mass, by increasing their wires section. However, this also increases the X/R ratio to at least 4.5, which can jeopardize the job of directional earth fault relays and also deteriorate the intended neutral voltage reduction to avoid arc restriking. Hence, an alternative solution is to consider the reactor as an ANP and add a single-phase resistor. The fault current will be therefore reduced to about 2/3 of the rated 300A SC current, and the generated heat to about a half. In addition, the resistor will damp the dc component, reducing a lot the mechanical stress on the reactor windings. This is the "return to origins" solution, but it requires an additional cost which has to be compared to the cost of improving the reactors design. Of course, combining the two solutions will provide a better safety margin.
A new preventive protective device
For already in the field old reactors and even for new ones, it is obvious the need for a new type of protection capable to handle the long time constants involved. In addition, the traditional idea for a protective relay to disconnect the faulted equipment is not very attractive. Actually, disconnecting a faulted reactor means to unearth the all network, and if the feeders are in such a bad shape that led the reactor to fail, after being unearthed the network behaviour is likely to worsen. Hence, we propose a device which works by locking the feeders reclosure, particularly the commanded reclosing, at least by alarming the remote operators. This device runs the presented thermal model and has only to know for how long and when a fault current crosses the reactor. A quite simple device which, because of the long thermal time constants involved, has no special real-time constrains. Hence, it can run on a PC and employ standard tools and network communications. A Matlab prototype was coded proving the concept.
